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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH
JOHN D.

~IARSHALL,

Plaintiff a;n.d

A~ppeUan.t,

vs.

Case No.

THE OGDEN UNION RAILWAY
AND DEPOT COMPANY, a corporation,

7407

Defenaant and Respondent.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
The parties will be designated as in the trial court.
All italics are ours.
All record citations of testimony refer to the
trial transcript unless otherwise designated.

se~ond

John D. Marshall, an empJoyee of the Southern Pacific Railroad Company, was injured in defendant's
passenger depot at Ogden, Weber County, Utah, at
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approximately 9 :00 o'clock a.m., on the 19th day of
June, 1947, while in the course of his employment as a
chair car porter for the Southern Pacific Railroad Company.
This action was commenced in the Second Judicial
District, in and for Weber County, State of Utah, on
March 1st, 1948. The case was first tried before the
Honorable John A. Hendricks on the 1st and 2nd days
of July, 1948, the jury returning a verdict in the sum of
$8,500.00, in favor of the plaintiff. Defendant filed
a motion for new trial and said Judge, after the motion
had been argued by respective counsel, entered an order
granting said motion. (R. 038).
The case was tried a second time before the Honorable L. Leland Larson, on the 23rd and 24th day.s of
February, 1949, the jury returning a verdict of No Cause
for Action in favor of the defendant and against the
plaintiff. Thereafter plaintiff moved for a new trial and
plaintiff's motion was on the 22nd day of April, 1949,
denied by said judge (R. 144).
Plaintiff hereby appeals from the order of Judge
Hendricks granting defendant's motion for a new trial
and also from certain errors committed by the Honorable
L. Leland Larson, Judge, during the progress of the
second trial of the case.
The facts. as herein set forth and discussed are
those presented at the se~ond trial. They are substanti·ally the same as were pres·ented at the first trial.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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B.

THE FACTS

John D. Marshall, a resident of San Francisco, California, was injured at approximately 9 :00 o'clock a.m.,
on the 19th day of J nne, 1947 at the Depot of the defendant company in Ogden, Utah, while in the course
of his employment as a chair car porter for the Southern
Pacific Railroad Company. At the time of his injuries
he was 30 :~ears of age. He had been employed by the
Southern Pacific Railroad Company approximately five
years, during which time he had worked as a chair car
porter (H. 6). His duties as a chair car porter were
generally assisting passengers on and off trains, handling luggage and keeping the car, to which he was assigned, clean (R. 6). Prior to his employment with the
Southern Pacific Railroad Company plaintiff had worked
at various odd jobs, all involving general manual labor
(R. 6, 7). During the month of June, 1947, and when
injured, plaintiff was working on trains operating between Oakland, California and Ogden, Utah (R. 7, 8).
The tracks in the Ogden Union Depot extend in a
general northerly-southerly direction. Track No. 7 is
immediately to the east of Tra;ck No. 8, etc. Passengers
approaching trains on said tracks pass through an underpath rampway onto the platforms between the tracks
and usually proceed north to where the passenger trains
are stationed (R. 8). Between Tracks No. 7 and No. 8
is a cement platform approximately 18 feet in width.
Extending down the center of the platform are certain
posts known as ''umbrella posts'' wh:lch support a canSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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opy over the platform for protection in inclement weather
.(R. 9).
At its depot in Ogden the defendant customarily uses
four-wheeled trucks in handling freight. These trucks
were described by plaintiff as being approximately six
or eight feet in length, three feet in width, two and onehalf or three fe·et in height. They have four metal wheels
and a tongue in front which '.can be attached to a small
three-wheeled jitney used in pulling them from place to
place within the depot (R. 10). Plaintiff's Exhibit" A"
is a photograph of such a truck and jitney.
On the morning he was injured plaintiff approached
his train at approximately 8:30 o'clock a.m. At that time
the train was on Track No.8, facing north and plaintiff's
chair car was four or five cars south of the head end of
of the train.
One of the umbrella posts was south of the north
entrance to plaintiff's chair car. Standing with its south
end against the post and on a slight northwest diagonal
was one of the four-wheeled trucks heretofore described.
The distance between the side of the chair car and the
umbrella post was nine feet as measured by the plaintiff shortly before the second trial (R. 22). The truck's
width was approximately three feet. Therefore, there
was at least seven or eight feet of space between the
east side of the coach and the truck within which avehicle could pass.
As to the occurrence of the a~ident, there is a ·sharp
dispute in the testimony. For the convenience of the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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5
court we present herewith the various versions as related
by the respective "itnesses.
Marshall testified that he approached his car,
checked to see if it was clean, placed the step box down
next to the north entrance to his chair car and took a
position eight or ten inches south of the step box, with
his back to the east side of the car. He testified that he
was at all times before the accident looking toward the
south for two small unescorted boys who were to ride
in his car that morning (R. 11-14); and that the first
time he saw the jitney and four-wheeled truck was when
Miller, the operator, drove past him (R. 15); that as
the jitney went past him he stepped back against the
side of his chair car; that the truck being drawn by the
jitney was carrying several trash boxes (R. 22).
He further testified that at the time the jitney drove
past him it was proceeding faster than a person could
walk (R. 23), and that after the truck struck him he fell
to the platform (R. 20). Marshall's testimony regarding
the odcurrence of the accident is as follows (R. 14):

'' Q. All right. I want you to now relate to the
jury just a little what happened.
A. I was standing there waiting for these two
little kids, and when I know anything, this
jitney came by and I stepped back. It was
too late for me to go anyway but that. The
truck Mr. Miller was hauling hit the corner
of the other truck and it hit me here (indicating), and put me against the train here (indicating).
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Q.

At the time you first realized that the jitney
tractor was traveling along the platform,
where was the front end of the tractor~

A. It was passed by.

Q. You became aware of its presence as it passed
by~

A. Yes, sir.

Q. And at that time what did you do?
A. Stepped back.''
Marshall testified clearly that there wa.s plenty of
room for the jitney and truck to have passed between
him and the standing trU:ck. His testimony in that regard is as follows (R. 30} :

'' Q. Mr. Marshall, one other matter; I want to
ask you this question: Was there space
enough between the sides of the car.s lo:cated
on track No. 8 and the protruding northwest
corner of the standing four-wheel truck, was
there space enough between there and between where your body was located ·and the
northwest corner of the four-wheeled truck
of the jitney and the other truck to have
passed at the time this accident happened~
A. There was plenty of room.''
And on cro.ss-examination (R. 31) :

'' Q. Mr. Marshall, there was plenty of room if
the trucks hadn't cornered~
A. Plenty of room, sir.''
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Hamilton, a braken1an for the Southern Pacific Railroad Company and the only disinterested witness, testified that he was che'cking the numbers of the cars when
he observed Marshall standing a short distance south of
the step box at the north entrance of his chair car and
that ~Iar~hall appeared to be looking toward the south
(R. 62); that he observed the jitney and truck proceeding
in a southerly direction; that he looked away and was
just going to take down the number of a coach when he
heard something bang and saw Marshall fall (R. 63).
He was unable to form an estimate as to the speed at
which the jitney and truck were proceeding as he observed them traveling south and past the ladies coach.
He te~tified in regard to the movement of the vehicle as
follows (R. 67):

'' Q. About how far was the jitney and the fourwheeled truck from the point of impa:ct when
you last saw it up there, before the impact~
A. I saw him coming by the baggage car, and
after that I saw it coming by the ladies coach.
I was checking there and I didn't notice it any
more until it hit.
Q. About how long after you saw it by the ladies
coach was it that you heard the impact~
A.

Oh, about as fast as I could walk, about three
miles an hour, maybe.''

This te~timony clearly indicates that the tractor and
four-wheeled truck did not stop in its progress toward
the south before the actual impact. Hamilton saw MarSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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shall fall to the platform after he heard the bang occasioned by the impact (R. 63).
Hamilton was never asked whether or not there was
sufficient and adequate space for the jitney and fourwheeled truck to have passed between where Marshall
was standing and the truck located next to the umbrella
post.
LeRoy Miller, who had been employed by defendant
company for approximately four and ·one-half years and
was the operator of the jitney and truck at the time of
the accident, testified on behalf of defendant. He stated
that he had been picking up rubbish boxes during the
course of the morning; that immediately before the accident he was proceeding in a southerly direction along
the platform and saw Marshall working near the coaches
on Train No. 23 ; that Marshall was standing south of his
foot box but that his foot box was opposite the south
entrance to the ladies coach; that Marshall was ''between
the couplings'' (R. 106). He testified that he stopped and
told Marshall to '' kinda step out'' and that Marshall
stepped back and he started forward, and that as he
started forward Marshall was standing still; that the
front corner of his truck struck the corner of the standing
truck causing his truck to swing around and strike the
car (R. 106). He testified that the jitney and truck was
just barely moving at the time the accident occurred, but
that nevertheless the truck slid sideways on its wheels
across the platform and struck the side of the ladies
chair car with a bang causing a dent in the car (R. 14-16).
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He further stated that as he went around Marshall he
started to pull out to keep from hitting Marshall and
that he never did look at the truck to his left during the
forward movement of the jitney and four-wheeled truck.
His testimony in regard to his own conduct as he proceeded past :Marshall is interesting and is set forth herein
as follows (R. 116) :

''Q. Weren't you watching the car~
A. No, I was watching Marshall.

'l

l

truck~

Q.

Didn't you ever watch the

A.

No, I never looked at the truck.

Q. You could see that

car~

A. I didn't pay any attention.
looked~

Q.

You could have seen if you had

A.

I didn't look at it. My wagon wasn't two
feet from that wagon, I came up to put the
box on.

Q. If you had looked over to the east, you :could
have seen that car, couldn't you~
A. I could have. There wasn't nothing between
me, hut I wasn't paying any attention.
Q. You thought you could get by Mr. Marshall~
A. I asked him to move his foot box and move
to the east.
Q. He didn't move, did he~
A. He says he had plenty of room, and I went
on and caught the end of the wagon and it
swung around and hit the car, and I asked
him, did it hit you in the stomach~
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Miller never testified directly as to whether or not
there was sufficient and adequate space for him to have
passed between Marshall and the standing truck in the
middle of the platform next to the umbrella post. However, his proceeding as he did clearly indicates he was
of the opinion that there was sufficient and adequate
space. His testimony that he swung out without looking
toward the east clearly ind~cates that his swinging out
was the thing which caused the impact of the vehicles
and the resulting accident (R. 116). The only inference
that can be drawn from Miller's testimony is that there
was actually sufficient space for him to have passed had
he kept a lookout on both sides of his vehicle rather than
on merely one.
Kenneth Malan, a car washer and witness called
by defendant, testified that he was washing the head end
of Train No. 23 at the time the accident took place·; that
he was about in the middle of Marshall's car (R. 92).
He saw Marshall just before the accident standing just
south of his step box which was located at the north
entrance of his chair car. In this regard Malan clearly
supports the testimony of Marshall and Hamilton. He
further testified that Miller stopped two or three feet
north of where Marshall was standing; that Miller and
Marshall had a conversation and that thereafter the
truck and trailer proceeded on to the south (R. 93, 94);
that the moving truck ·struck the corner of the standing
truck throwing the rear end of the moving truck on a
diagonal to the west and toward Marshall (R. 95) ; that
at the time of the accident the speed of the tractor was
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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approximately that of a man walking very slowly (R.
10:2). However, he admits that the truck skidded sideways across the platform and that the rear end of the
truck struck either Marshall or the chair car (R. 95) ;
that after the accident ~Iarshall squeezed himself out
from between the truck and the chair car, walked around
and leaned on the wagon; that a brakeman walked over
and asked :Jiarshall how he felt and stated that he ought
to go sit down and rest (R. 96, 97). Malan assumed that
he was struck by the truck as he saw him double up,
make his way over and lean against the other truck
(R. 98).
l\falan testified that after Miller started forward
with the jitney and tru.ck he, Malan, moved up against
the car in anticipation of the movement of the vehicle
past him. That that was the manner in which he always
handled this situation; that he never stepped to the other
side of the platform when a jitney and truck were proceeding past him (R. 101, 102). He felt there was plenty
of room for the jitney and truck to move past if he
stepped up beside the ear (R.101).
Louis Stegge also testified for defendant. He was
by occupation a car man and at the time of the accident
was working on a car to the north of where the accident
occurred. He never was closer than twenty feet from
where the accident occurred (R. 126). A reading of his
testimony indicates that Stegge wasn't sure whether
Marshall was standing south of the south entrance to the
ladies car or south of the north entrance to Marshall's
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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chair car (R. 132, 133). It seems unbelievable that Marshall would have been standing at the south entrance
of the ladies car inasmuch as he had no duties to perform
with regard to the ladies car. Marshall testified that the
south end of the ladies car was a blind end and that there
were no entrances lo:cated there whatsoever (R. 135).
Stegge testified that Miller stopped a shqrt distance
north of where Marshall was standing; that a conversation occurred between Miller and Marshall; that he saw
Marshall signify by movement of his hand to come ahead
and that the jitney and truck proceeded ahead about
four or five feet when the standing truck and the moving
truck cornered causing the moving truck to swing diagonally to the west. He admitted that Marshall was standing still as the vehicles proceeded past him, with his
back to the east side of the coa;ch (R. 127). :Sitegge
wasn't asked whether or not there was sufficient and
adequate room for the jitney and truck to have passed
between the standing truck and Marshall. · Therefore,
his testimony must be considered as neutral in this
regard, casting no inferences one way or the other.
Plaintiff remained at the place where the accident
happened for a short time and then made his way to
the trainmaster's office (R. 21). Thereafter, he went
to the office of the company doctor, which is located
on Washington Boulevard, and from there was sent to
St. Benedict's Hospital, where he remained for two
days (R. 21). He then returned to Oakland by train,
spent one night at home and the next day reported to
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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the Southern P~cific Hospital (R. 24). He was at the
hospital continuously for approximately one week and
thereafter remained as an out patient. The total period
of his hospitalization at the Southern Pacific General
Hospital was forty-four days (R. 25). During that period
he was unable to work (R. 25, 26). In May of 1948 plaintiff was again hospitalized for a period of six days.
He had mistakenly testified at the previous trial that
he was hospitalized on this occasion for two weeks.
During the six days of his hospitalization he underwent
treatment and general observation. At the time of trial
he was still experiencing pain in his back (R. 26-28).
Plaintiff was earning approximately $218.00 per
month at the time of his injury as a salary and in addition was making ·between $15.00 and $30.00 per month
in tips (R. 29).
Doctor Fisher, a regularly licensed physician, and
specialist in orthopedic surgery, testified by deposition
on behalf of the plaintiff. He examined plaintiff on
December 20, 1947. The examination revealed muscle
spasm in the lower area of plaintiff's back and that he
was suffering from sub-a;cute low hack strain and a
contusion of the lower abdomen together with a mild
Schmorl 's disease of the spine. Schmorl 's disease is
not caused by trauma, but prolongs the healing period
(R. 83-84). His opinion was stated as follows (R. 84):
''A. Yes, I feel if you are going to get this man
well, I don't think that he is going to get
well probably unless he shifts to s:ome type
of work where he wouldn't have to do heavy
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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lifting for some considerable 'period of time,
I would say at least six months and probably
more, possibly more.''
The jury was warranted in finding aceording to plaintiff's testimony that he was standing against his car and
looking to the south; that Miller drove the jitney and
truck to and beyond his position at an excessive rate of
speed without keeping a lookout, cornered the standing
vehicle and caused the accident. The jury was also warranted in finding from defendant's evidence that Miller
approached Marshall and stopped; that a conversation
o'ccurred; that Marshall took a position back against
the coach and that Miller proceeded beyond him, cornered with the standing vehicle causing the accident.
It was uncontroverted that Marshall, after the vehicle
had once started past him, never moved from the position he had taken and was at all times observed and
observable by Miller. It is uncontroverted that the truck
cornered with the standing truck, skidded sideways
a:cross the platform and toward and into the plaintiff.
It is uncontroverted that Miller, as he proceeded past
plaintiff, was not keeping any lookout whatsoever to the
eaot but was looking solely in the direction of Marshall
who was standing against the coach. It was uncontroverted that there was plenty of room forr the jitnevy o;n;d
truck to have passed between the p~laJirntiff and the st~andi
ilng truck had defendant ope'nated the jitney and truck
in an efficient manner; that Marshall could have done
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nothing- further to avoid the accident once the jitney
passed him, and that the cause of the accident was the
~ornering of the vehicles.
ASSIGNniENT OF ERRORS
1. The court erred in granting defendant's motion
for new trial (R. 038).
2.

The court erred in refusing to give Plaintiff's

Requested Instruction No. 3 (second trial) (R. 042).
3. The court erred in giving Instruction No. 7
(second trial) (R. 063, 064).
4. The court erred rn giving Instruction No. 11
(second trial) (R. 066).
5. The court erred in refusing to grant plaintiff's
motion for a new trial following the second trial (R. 078).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
POINT I.
DEFENDANT FAILED TO SHOW DUE DILIGENCE
IN DISCOVERING SO-CALLED NEWLY DISCOVERED
EVIDENCE BEFORE AND DURING TRIAL AND INASMUCH AS SUCH NEWLY DISCOVERED EVIDENCE WAS
FOR IMP,EACHMENT PURPOSES, ONLY AND DOES NOT
APPEAR TO BE OF SUFFICIENT MATERIALITY TO HAVE
AFFECTED THE VERDICT, THE TRIAL COURT ERRED
IN GRANTING A NEW TRIAL ON THAT BASIS. (As!signment of Error No.1).
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POINT II.
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL
ERROR IN GIVING INSTRUCTION NO. 7. (Assignment of
Error No. 3).

POINT III.
THERE WAS NO EVIDENTIARY BASIS FOR THE
SUBMISSION OF THE ISSUE OF PLAINTIFF'S CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE TO THE JURY. (Assignment of
Errors No.2, 3 and 5).

POINT IV.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO SUBMIT
THE ISSUE OF LAST CLEAR CHANCE TO THE JURY.
(Assignment of Errors No.2 and 5).

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
DEFENDANT FAILED TO SHOW DUE DILIGENCE
IN DISCOVERING SO-CALLED NEWLY DISCOVERED
EVIDENCE BEFORE AND DURING TRIAL AND INASMUCH AS SUCH NEWLY DISCOVERED EVIDENCE WAS
FOR IMP1EACHMENT PURPOSES ONLY AND DOES NOT
AP,PEAR TO BE OF SUFFICIENT MATERIALITY TO HAVE
AFFECTED THE VERDICT, THE TRIAL COURT ERRED
IN GRANTING A NEW TRIAL ON THAT BASIS. (Assignment of Error No.1).

We recognize the law to be well settled that the
granting or denying of a motion for new trial is largely
within the discr,etionary powers of the trial court. See
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Moser v. Zion's Co-Op. lllercantile Inst. et
197 p. 2d 136.

,az.,

(Utah)

H·owever, appellate courts have traditionally exer~ised a supervisory control over the discretionary powers
as exercised by trial courts and have on numerous occasions reversed the rulings of trial courts in granting
motions for new trial. It is manifestly clear that the
discr~tionary power of trial courts is not a mental discretion giving effect to the will of the judge, but is a
legal discretion to be exercised in conformity with the
spirit of the law.
In Hayne, New Trial ,and Appe:al, vol. 2, Sec. 289,
the author discusses the discretionary power of the trial
court in granting or refusing to grant a motion for new
trial and states as follows:

'' * * * This is not always easy to determine,
but the task is greatly simplified when it is remembered that the discretion referred to is legal
and never arbitrary. There must be a legal
ground or excuse for every act of the court, and
not a mere arbitrary exercise of power by the
will of the individual who happens to occupy the
position of judge. Not only must there he a legal
ground or excuse in support of the exercise of
discretionary power, but there must be some fact
or reason against the same, otherwise there would
be no basis for an exercise of discretion. Moreover, the discretion of the court must always be
exercised in behalf of justice and fair dealing
in the abstract, and manifestly must not be contrary to the principles of justice or productive
of hardship and inconvenience. If this should he
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the case, there would be, in the language of the
authorities, an abuse of discretion, and the appellate court would reverse the judgment or order.
This is not a very precise rule; but, when interpreted by the light of the circumstances of each
case, it is of practical value, and prevails in all
courts where the common law is the rule of decision.''
We herein cite and discuss a number of cases in
which appellate courts have set aside orders granting
m·otions for new trial as abuses of legal discretion.
In Hinton v. Peterson, et al., (Mont.) 169 P. 2d 333,
334, the appellate court concluded from the facts that
the court's action in granting the new trial was based
upon the view of the court that the evidence was insufficient to support the verdict, and stated:
"* * • The court disagreed with the jury
on the issue of the terms of the contract of employment. The court accepted defendants' version of it while the jury ~ccepted that of plaintiff.''
The case was remanded back to the trial court with
instructions to set aside the ruling granting a new trial
and to reinstate the verdict. The court cited the following quotation from B·adboy v. Br-own, 66 Mont. 307, 213
P. 246, 247 with approval:

"* * *'While it is the general rule, frequently
enunciated by this court, that the granting or
refusing of a motion for a new trial· rests in the
sound legal discretion of the trial court, yet this
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diseretion is not so unrestricted as to permit the
trial court to act arbitrarily, or without substantial basis. Legal discretion must always be guided
and controlled by legal principles. Montana 0. P.
Co. v. Boston & ~I. C. C. & S. ~I. Co., 22 Mont.
159, 56 P. 120. This court will not, as a rule,
interfere \\ith the discretion vested in the trial
court in granting or refusing a new trial; but
when it appears, as it does in this case, that such
discretion has been exercised without any sufficient or substantial reason, then it must be controlled. Holland v. Huston, 20 Mont. 84, 49 P.
390. Here the abuse of discretion on the part of
the trial court in granting to the defendant Brown
a new trial is manifest, for there is no evidence
or basis in the record for the court's order.
'Under the statute, the amount of the verdict
must of necessity rest in the sound discretion of
the jury. The parties are entitled to a verdict
from the jury, and it is only in rare instances
that the 'court is justified in interfering, unless
the record discloses that the elements of passion
and prejudice have influenced the minds of the
jurors in arriving at the result.' Hollenback v.
Stone & Webster Eng. Corp., 46 Mont. 559, 129 P.
1058. The jury having fixed the amount of plaintiffs' damages based on evidence warranting the
verdict, and there being nothing in the record to
indicate passion and prejudice, or warranting
a reduction of the amount of the verdict, the trial
court was clearly in error.' ''

In Sharpensteen v. Sanguinetti (Ariz.) 262 P. 609,
610, the appellate court reviewing the grounds upon
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which a motion for new trial had been granted, discussed the facts as follows :
''The affidavit of newly dis'covered evidence
is not sufficient. It simply shows that affiant,
'acting for and on behalf of defendant' had made
discovery of what he calls evidence. So far as
this affidavit is concerned, the defendant and his
attorney may have known of such alleged evidence at the time of and before the trial. A prope:r
and sufficient ,affidavit should have negatived
such possibility.''

I

!he

i

And, in overruling the trial court's order granting
a new trial stated at p. 611 :
"It is of course the law that the granting of
a new trial is largely in the discretion of the trial
court, and that the reviewing court will not disturb the ruling except for an abuse of that discretion. What is meant by discretion in that connection is a legal discretion, one based upon
reason and law. If the showing for a new trial
is insufficient both iln form amd substarrvce:, as the
one here appears to be, it may be s~aid that there
is no discret~on to be exercised. The rule that
should guide the trial judge in passing upon a
motion for new trial is very well stated in Sovereign Camp, etc., v. Thiebaud, 65 Kan. 332, 69
P. 348, as follows:
"'The discret'ion of &trict courts in the
matte;r of grarnting or r-efusing neYtV' trials is
,a legal, no't 'a oaJrPricious, one. It must be
warranted by lmw, arnd guided by established
preoedent. It mary noit be exercised ~mpl;y
becOJUSe the jwdge might wish the verdict to1
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I~

be otherwise. The test and w~arrant ·for its
use is, Has the ,applioaJY~Jt .therefor s·hown a
legalrreason for >its existence?' "
And in Belt
the court stated:

·~

,.

..

'l'.

ill orris (Okla.), 34 P. 2d 581, 584,

'' • • * The 'discretion' spoken of in the
authorities is a legal discretion; a discretion to
be exercised in discerning the course preseribed
by the law, according to prineiples ascertained
by adjudged cases. 'J udrcial power, as eontradistinguished from the power of the law, has no
existence,' it was said by Chief J ustiee Marshall
in Osborn et al. v. Bank of United States, 9 Wheat.
738, 6 L. Ed. 204, 234. Courts are the mere instruments of the law, and ean will nothing. Judicial
power is not exercised forr the purpose of givitng
effect to the will ·of the judge, but always for the
:purpose of !}iving effect to the will of the law.
To one coming within the rule anrnounc:ed, a new
trial should be given ·as ·a matter of right, not
merely as a result of the exercise of the oorurt's
will. So, on the other harnd, whe;re the oourt: grants
a new trial, but in doing so iJJisreg,ards the rules
of law contr1o·lling the exercise of the pow·er, its
action presents a question of law reviewable on
appeal.' ''
In Russell v. M.argo, (Okla.), 67 P. 2d 22, 26, the court
stated:
"In the case of Sprtice v. Chicago, R. & P. R.
Co., 139 Okl. 123, 281 P. 586, 589, this court said:
'The courts everywhere recognize the right of an
appellate court to review the action of a trial
court in sustaining motions for new trials where
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there has been an abuse of discretion or arbitrary
action. Otherwise the complete right of appeal
could be denied in most instances, and in fact all
instances. For example, the court could repeatedly in the same cause set aside the verdict of the
jury and grant a new trial on the insuff~ciency
of the evidence, and thereby deprive the party
who obtained the verdict of the benefit of a complete right of appeal. In other words, to vest in
the trial courts absolute discretion as to questions
of fact or miaJed quesf}ions of law arnd fiact would
be an absolut-e barrie·r between the aggrieved litigant .a.nd the Suprem.e Court.'
"We agree with the holding of the court in
the above case, and where the issue is properly
presented on appeal, this court will review the
entire record to determine whether or not the
trial court in granting a motion for new trial
has abused its discretion, acted arbitrarily, or
erred on some unmixed question of law.''
In Mazzotta v. Los Angeles Ry. Oovrp., et. ·al. (Oal.),
145 P. 2d 662, 666, the trial court granted a motion for
new trial and the appellate court reversed that order
and stated the governing principles of an appellate
court in considering whether or not the granting of a
motion for new trial was within the discretionary power
of the trial court or beyond its discretion in the following language :

'' * * * While, as respondent asserts, court·s
have often held that judicial discretion is broad
and inclusive, nevertheless it is a legal discretion, and must be exercised in consonance with
fixed legal principles. Judidal discretion is neither
capricious notr ·arbit~ary. As was saJi;d, in Baiky
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v. Taaffe, 29 Cal. -l-22, 424, 'It is not a mental
discretion, to be exercised ex gra.tia, but. a legal
discretion, t·o be exercised in conformity with the
spirit of the lalf, and in a manner to subserve and
not to impede or defeat the ends of substantial
justice.' The phrase ·'judicial discretion' implies
the use of discriminating judgment within the
bounds of reason and bridled by legal principles,
the application of which will tend to promote'
justice and equity. In the light of what has just
been said, we now proceed to a consideration of
the instructions given, and the giving of which,
respondent urges, entitles him to a new trial.''
See also the following interesting cases:

Sovereign Camp, Woodmen of The World, v. Thiebaud, 65 Kan. 332, 69 P. 348; Rothrrrwm v. Rumb·ack
(Ariz.), 96 P. 2d 755; Arthur v. Parish (Ore.), 47 P.
2d 682.
This ·case was tried before Judge Hendricks on July
1st and 2nd, 1948. During the trial plaintiff testified
regarding his hospitalization as follows (R. 18, 19, first
trial):

"Q. Now, have you missed any work since going
back to work the second time~
A. Yes. I missed a couple of weeks here not
long ago. I was in the hospital on the 25th
of last month.

Q. That would be May 25th~
A.

Yes.

Q. How long were you in the hospital on that
occasion~
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A.

Two weeks.

Q.

Were you continuously in the hospital during
that two weeks~

A. Yes, I was in there for two weeks.
Q.

Were you an 'out' patient or in there all
that time~

A. In the hoapital- no- no out patient.
Q.

What were you in the hospital for, Mr.
Marshall~

A. My injury.

Q. The condition of your back~
A. Yes.
Q.

Were you receiving treatments of any kind
during that two weeks~

A. Well, I was taking the same treatments.
Q.

Those heating-pad

A.

Yes.

treatments~

Q. You were not, of course, able to work during
that two weeks~
A. No, I ·wasn't.
Q. Now, in addition to that two weeks have you
missed any other work~
A. No, I didn't mios any other."
At the conclusion of the case and after a verdict had
been rendered in favor of plaintiff, counsel for defendant filed a motion for new trial. Thereafter, he filed
affidavits in support o.f said motion. The primary
ground contended for by defenaant in its motion for new
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trial was '• newly discovered evidence rna terial to the
defendant which it could not with reasonable diligence
have discovered and produced at the trial." (R. 147,
first transcript). Thereafter, affidavits by Dr. Russell
J. :Merritt, of the Southern Pacific Hospital, in San Francisco, California, and of M. J. Bronson, counsel for the
defendant, were duly filed in support of defendant's
motion. Counter-affidavits on behalf of plaintiff were
also filed. John D. Marshall filed an affidavit as did
Wayne L. Black, counsel for John D. Marshall, and
Robert Asch, who is Assistant Business Manager of
the Southern Pacific Hospital, at San Francis,co, California. These affidavits are a part of the record. (R.
151-160). Generally they are to the effect that Marshall
was hospitalized from the 21st day of May, 1948 to the
27th day of May, 1948, at which time he was discharged.
Plaintiff's affidavit indicates that he was honestly mistaken as to the length of time he was hospitalized but
that after the case had been tried and after he had
been requested to check the records of the hospital he
discovered that he was hospitalized one week rather than
two weeks.
The affidavit of Mr. M. J. Bronson, counsel for
defendant, was to the effect that on May 15th, 1948, he
was at San Francisco, California and investigated the
hospital records to determine the length of plaintiff's
hospitalization; that this was the only investigation
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regarding plaintiff's hospitalization that he made until
after the trial had been :completed, and up until the
time plaintiff testified at the trial Mr. Bronson did not
know that plaintiff was hospitalized in May of 1948. (R.
153, 154).
The affidavit of Mr. Wayne L. Black, counsel for
the plaintiff, reveals that he called Mr. Bronson by telephone on the 24th day of May, 1948 and notified him
that this case could not be tried on May 26th, 1948 for
the reason that plaintiff was at the time hospitalized
in the Southern Pacific General Hospital. Mr. Black's
affidavit further reveals that on or about the 25th day
of June, 1948 he discussed this case with Mr. Miles E.
Goodnow, General Claim Agent of defendant, and notified Mr. Goodnow of plaintiff's hospitalization during
May of 1948 and that Mr. Goodnow, ever ·.since that date,
was well aware of plaintiff's hospitalization in the Southern Pacific General Hospital (R. 157-159). Of course,
it was within the discretion of the trial court to defermine the facts as revealed by the affidavits. It is true,
however, that defendant's affidavits did not controvert
the fa ct that Mr. Goodnow was notified before trial of
plaintiff's hospitalization.
1

The sole ground argued by counsel for defendant
In its motion for new trial was that of the so-called
newly discovered evidence. There was no argument made
that the verdict was contrary to law or excessive. Judge
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Hendricks followed the suggestion of this court in S:aUas
v. Affleck et al., 105 P. 2d 176, 178, and set forth clearly
and specifically his reasons for granting the motion.
His order reads as follows (R. 038):
"After studying the affidavits and transcribed testimony of the plaintiff, and taking into
consideration the emphasis that Plaintiff's Counsel put on the defendant's confinement for two
weeks in the hospital, the Court is of the opinion
that the jury was influenced to the extent that
they undoubtedly allowed excessive special damages, and also probably caused to award general
damages in excess of what they would have
awarded had they known the facts about his stay
in the hospital in May.
"It is therefore ORDERED, that a new trial
be granted.
"Dated this 28th day of August, 1948.
J.ohn A. Hendricks
District Judge''
The facts concerning the so-called newly discovered
evidence being largely uncontroverted, it became a clear
question of law whether the motion for new trial should
have been granted. If the guiding principles of law
laid down by this court were disregarded by the trial
court in its ruling it follows as a ne:cessary conclusion
that the trial court abused its legal discretion.
The general rule of law governing the trial court
in granting or denying a motion for new trial is set forth
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in Klopenstine v. Hays, 20 Utah 45, 57 P. 712, 714, where
the court stated:

"* * * 'It is well settled that, to entitle a
defeated party to a new trial on the ground of
newly-discovered evidence, it must ap~ar, (1)
that he used reasonable diligence to discover and
produce at the fo.rmer trial the newly-discovered
evidence, and that his failure to do so was not
the result of his own negligence; ( 2) that the
newly-discovered evidence is not simply cumulative; (3) that such evidence is not sufficient if it
simply be to impeach an adverse witness; (4)
it must be material to the issues, and so important
as to satisfy the court, by reasonable inference,
that the verdict or judgment would have been
different had the newly-discovered evidence been
introduced on the former trial; (5) that the defeated party had no opportunity to make the defense, or was prevented from doing so by unavoidable accident, or the fraud or improper conduct
of the other party, without fault on his part.' ''
In at least three particulars the trial court violated
established principle in granting defendant's motion for
new trial.
(a) The trial court abused its ibiscretion W'hetn it
held in effect that -defendamt had exercised due diligence
in endeavoring to ·ascertain the so-oalZe:d new·Zy disco'V·ered
evidence prior t.o and ·at the time 0f the trial.
1

Governing principles regarding defendant's. duty
of diligence are stated in the following citations :
39 A.m. Jur. Sec. 156, p. 163:

'' * * * The rule to be dedtuced from the cases
lis that where new[;y discovered evidence is of su,ch
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conclusive nature, or of su.ch decisive or prep,onde.rating character, that it would with reasonable
cer"bainty have chamged. the V·erdict or materially
reduced the recovery, a new trial should be granted if ~t is satisfactorily shown why the evidence
was not discovered and produced at the time of
the trial.''
39 Am. Jur. Sec. 161, p. 168

~and

Sec. 163, p. 170:

"Sec. 161.-What Constitutes Diligence in
Procuring Evidence.-The question as to whether
or not the party's failure to produce the newly
discovered evidence at the trial was attributable
to negligence or want of diligence is to be resolved, of course, in view of the circumstances
of the case. Very evidently, if it is to be concluded that he possessed, prior to the trial, no
means of knowing that the evidence was obtainable, he is not 'chargeable with lack of diligence.
On the other hand, the application for a new tr+bal
will be denied where it ·appears that the degree
of activity or diligenee which led to· the discove-ry
of the evfidence ~after the trial would have produced it had it been exercised p'rior the~e:to.

* * * * * *
''Sec. 163.-Proof of Exercise of Diligence.Proof that the applicant has not been guilty of
negligence or want of diligence must be presented by the supporting affidavits. The facts
which disclose the exercise of diligenJpe must be
- set forth; an averment of diligence in general
terms is not sufficient. It has been said that the
affidavit must be characterized by a greater degree of certainty than is required in a pleading,
and that the· averments thereof must negative
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every circumstance from which negligence can
be in£ erred.''
In Rydalch v. Anderson (Jan. 6, 1910), 37 Utah 99,
107 P. 25, 31 this court laid down the rule regarding
defendant's duty of diligence.

"* * * Oownsel thus knew at the trial what
respondent's testimorrvy was. If they did not think
it was true, and we;re surprised by it, they should
then have applied to the court to: postpone further
trial of the ;case until they could obtain the t.est'imony contradictory of respondent's statement.
The question of oounsel's diligence in ascertaining whether there was any such evid,ence, and in
procuring it, would then have been presented to
and considered by the trial court.''
And in Snell v. Cisler (Jan. 1876), 1 Utah 298, 303,
the court stated :
''The Defendant's affidavit, so far from
showing any grounds for a new trial, ·shows a
lack of 'diligence upon his part which is inexcusable. If a ~pwrty omits to procure evidence on
the trial, which With !Ordinary diligenJpe he might
have procured in reZat~on to~ the material issue
in the case, his motion for ·a new trial ovught to
be denied.''
See also HydraulJic Cemerl)t Block Co. v. Christensen,
38 Utah 525, 114 P. 524, 526, where the court stated:

''* * *Courts oa'fi!YI)ot grant new tr:mls meref;y
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sian, ma.kes a. showing that upo.n ,a second trial he
can produce additional evidence in support of his
conte-nNo(ns which will probably turn the decision
in his favor. He must use due diligence to produce his evidence when the case comes on for
trial, and, unless he does so, the court is powerless to help him. In this case there is no showing
whatever that the plaintiff used any diligence
to produce the alleged newly discovered evidence
at the trial. The court, therefore, committed no
error in overruling the motion for that reason.''
And Salt Lake Inv. Co. v. Storutt, 54 Utah 100, 180
P. 182, 184, where the court said:

"* * * But assuming, further, that defendant
was justified in believing that inasmuch as the trial
was had in Salt Lake City, and the bank was also
situated there, he might apply at any time, even
on the eve of the trial, and procure the information desired, nevertheless when appellant found at
the trial that the books and records of the bank
were inaccessible for the reasons stated, no motion was made for a continuance, and the trial
court had no opportunity to afford relief even if
it had been so inclined. Appellant elected to stand
upon the proposition that it was the duty of the
plaintiff to produce the records, and went to trial
without the evidence which in the nature of the
case he must have known was in existence and
could easily be dis~overed.
''Many of the ootho-rities ~above cited treat
the failure of a party to seas~onably 1apply for ·a
oontiwuarnce u,nder such dircumstarnces as fa"bal to
am application for a new trial.
''However, much the court might desire to
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ing to which they are entitled, yet it cannot ignore
fundamental rules of practice established by
statute and recognized by general law in order to
achieve its :conception of even-handed justice in
a particular case.''
In Rath v. Ba;nkst>on, et al (Cal. Oct. 17, 1929), 281
P. 1081, 1086, judgment was for defendants and plaintiff
appealed urging that the trial court should have granted
a new trial on the basis of newly discovered evidence.
Affidavits revealed that plaintiff had discovered witnesses who would testify that the truck and trailer involved could have been backed to the curb and hence
that the testimony of defendants' witness to the effect
that such movement was impossible was false. The appellate court, in supporting the trial court's ruling denying
the motion for new trial, stated:

"* * * The fact that Case swore falsely
(assuming such to be the fact merely for argument's sake) would not justify the contention that
appellant was taken by surprise by his testimony.
There is nothing to show that she was led to believe that his testimony would be other than it
was, or that she did not have ample time to prepare to meet every issue of fact relevant to the
cause. As said in Pico v. Cohn, 91 Cal. 129, 25 P.
970, 971, 13 L.R.A. 336, 25 Am. St. Rep. 159, a
litig,ant ~at the trial 'must. be prepared t:or meet and
expose perjury then and there.' The testimony
of Case was given on May 21, 1926, atnd it would
seem that appellant had ample time to make ·any
inquiries ~as t:o its probable truth or falsity, as well
as ,a;n,y ~actual test on the ground be:tween that tim.e
arnd M~ay 24 when she rested her case. Moreover,
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the affidavits on motion for new trial show that
the 'test' was actually made on May 25, 1926, and
as we have noted, when the case was reopened
on ~lay 27, the record shows no offer of this testimony by appellant.''
Mourning v. Harrison (Kan., Nov. 8, 1941), 154 Kan.
242, 118 p. 2d 558, 559 :

"In the early case of Smith v. Williams, 11
Kan. 104, 106, it was stated: 'The motion was
based on the ground of newly-discovered evidence. While the rules by which motions of this
kind must be determined are well settled, and
clearly defined, yet in the application of these
rules much must be left to the discretion of the
trial court. When a case has been once fairly
submitted to· a jury, the verdict .ought not t·o· be
-disturbed, OJnd the successful vpa;rty put to the
lahor, the expense, and the hazard of OJYtother
tr"ial for any light or trivial reasons, 10r w,pon the
mere possibility of a different verdict.' ''
1

See also Geotrge G. Leavitt Co. v. Oouturier (Utah,
July 12, 1933), 23 P. 2d 1101.
In the case at bar defendant's only claim of due diligence is that Mr. Bronson examined the S'outhern Pacific
General Hospital records on the 15th day of May, 1948.
Defendant's affidavits do not negative plaintiff's counsel's sworn statement that Claim Agent Goodnow was
informed on June 24th, 1948, a week before trial, that
plaintiff claimed to have been hospitalized at the Southern Pacific General Hospital during the latter part of
May, 1948. In spite of this fact no effort was made by
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defense counsel to check on plaintiff's hospitalization
until after an adverse verdict. Defendant's affidavits
rather than showing the exercise of due diligence, show
a lack of diligence of the grossest sort. If counsel considered the hospitalization issue to be so vital to his
case why didn't he make a telephone call during or before the trial~ Why didn't he bring this matter to the
attention of the trial court~ Why didn't he move for a
continuance~ The facts were always easily and readily
accessible. Why should plaintiff be saddled with the
onerous burden of a new trial be:cau.se of opposing counsel's inattention to his case~ If defendant had exercised
that diligence before or during the trial which it exercised after an adverse verdict, it is hardly disputable
that his .so-called newly discovered evidence would have
been fully revealed.
We feel entirely justified in stating our contention
that the trial court acted arbitrarily and capriciously
when it granted a motion for new trial on the ground
of newly discovered evidence without requiring defendant to show as a ne;cessary condition precedent the exercise of due diligence before and during the trial.

The trial court ·abused its discretion when it
g'ranted defendant's motio.n for new trial on the baslis of
·so-called newly discovered evidence w·hich was o'ffered
and ultimately used for the sole pwrpose of impe·achment.
(h)
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39 Am. Jur. Sec. 167, p. 173, states the rule regarding newly discoYered impeachment evidence:
''Sec.167. Impeaching Evidence; Testimony
Contradicting Witness.-It is. well settled that a
new trial will not be granted upon the ground of
newly discovered evidence where it appears that
such new evidence can have no other effect than
to discredit the testimony of a witness at the
original trial, contradict a witness's statements,
or impeach a witness, unless the testimony of the
"itness who is sought to be impeached was so
important to the issue, and the evidence impe.ach-ing the witness so strong arnd :c.onvinding, that a
diffMent result must necessarily follow."
In Rydalch v. Anderson, supra, the court, speaking
of newly discovered evidence, stated:

'' '* * * Is it of that character for which a. new
trial should have been granted? We think not.
The evidence, in all .of fits bearings, is at most. only
cont'11adictory of what respondent said, arnd; that,
too, upon a collateral matter. Again, assuming
that it was not merely contradictory, it ·still remains a fact that it did not have great, if any,
bearing upon the real issue, which issue was : Did
the original owners establish and acquiesce in a
boundary line between the Kimball and Rydalch
lands 1 These facts, as we have pointed out, are
not even seriously disputed by the evidence. The
legal effect of the evidence of the Oregon witness,
therefore, would simply be an attack upon the
credibility of the respondent as a witness. If all
that respondent said with regard to what some of
the Kimball heirs stated to him at or immediately
preceding the time he bought the land were enSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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tirely ignored, the findings and judgment should
still he the same."

Van Horn v. Fa~ific Refining & Roo~fing Co., 27 Cal.
App. 105, 148 P. 951, 954, discusses newly discovered impeachment testimony:
''The appellant further contends that its motion for a new trial should have been granted upon
the ground of newly discovered evidence. The two
items of newly discovered evidence upon which
the appellant relied were, first, a written statement of one of the plaintiff's main witnesses as
to the circuf5tances of the accident, made a day or
two after its occurrence, which varied in certain
material respects from his testimony given at
the trial, and which the defendant claims it could
have used for the purpose of impeachment of such
witness, had this written statement been in its
possession at the time his testimony was given.
It is a well-established rule, however, that newly
discove.red evlidence, which is simply impeaching
or cumulative in character, is insufficient to
support a motion fior a new trial. People v. Goldenson, 76 Cal. 328, 19 Pac. 161.''
1

Tuc·son Rapid Transit Co. v. Rubiiaz (Ariz. Feb. 2,
1920) 21 Ariz. 221, 187 P. 568, 572:
"The affidavits of witnesses which, appellant
claims will furnish material evidence on another
trial, were presented with the motion. The purport of the evidence which, it is claimed, will be
forthcoming at a new trial, is that the plaintiff
was suffering from an active case of tuberculosis
for a long time prior to and continuing up to the
time of the accident involved. Assuming that the
showing of diligen'ce made is sufficient, yet such
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testimony would not preclude a recovery, a.s we
have seen above. Moreover, the evidence promised
could be of no service to establish any material
fact other than the condition of plaintiff's health
at the time of the accident, and thereby reduce
the resultant injuries to that of aggravation of her
diseased condition. The instruction of the court
permitted the jury to determine plaintiff's damages arising from aggravation of the di.sease. Ad,..
ditional testimony of the physical condition of
the plaintiff does not call for a new trial. Testimony of witnesses which serves to contradict the
testimony of the plaintiff, if such is the nature and
purpose of the newly di.scovered evidence, is not
of much materiality to the case as to require a
new trial. The trial court committed no reversible
error in refusing a new trial upon the alleged
ground of material evidence newly discovered.''
In the case at bar it would seem that whether plaintiff's condition a year after his injury called for one or
two weeks hospitalization was not of sufficient materiality to call for a new trial.
See al.so Waer v. Waer et al., (Cal. June 17, 1922)',
189 Cal. 178, 207 P. 891; Sa;wyer v. Nelson et ux., (Cal.
July 15, 1931) 1 P. 2d 1068; White v. Kans,as City Publip
Servic-e Co., (Kan. Jan. 28, 1933), 18 P. 2d 156, and Pan·dol~o et ,al v. Jackson et al. (Cal. Mar. 2, 1936), 55 P. 2d
550, 552, where the court said:

'' * * * M oreove;r, it has been s,aid in this
respect that after defe,at a motJion for new trial
upon the grounds mentioned is regarded with distrust (lffl)d disfav:orr, and that such 'f1!10ffered new~
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-discove~ed

evidence is looked upon wlith suspi-

cion.''

The trial court in this case made the following erroneous statement in its order granting the motion for new
trial ( R. 038) :

'' * * * the Court is of the opinion that the
jury was influenced to the extent that they undoubtedly allowed excessive special damages.''
Plaintiff testified at the trial, repeated in his counter-affidavit after defendant's motion for new trial, and
testified again at the selcond trial that he was actually
unable to work .during May of 1948 for a period of two
weeks. No -claim was made by plaintiff for his medical
expenses. Whether he was in the hospital one week or
two weeks did not and could not have had any effect
on plaintiff's special damages. Defendant contends that
the fact plaintiff was hospitalized one week rather than
two weeks has a direct bearing on whether or not plaintiff was permanently injured. This contention seems
to be hardly plausible in view of the bulk of testimony
regarding plaintiff's injuries and after effects. The
true purpose of the evidence was to impeach plaintiff's
credibilty. Of that there can be no reasonable doubt.
This is further borne out by the fact that at the second
trial there were no witnesses offered by defendant whatsoever regarding the period of plaintiff's hospitalization
or the treatment which he received at the hospital. Crossexamination questions were asked and that was the full
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sum and substance of the important newly discovered
evidence.
We submit that said evidence, being simply impeaching in character, was not a legally sufficient reason for
the trial court to exercise its discretion in granting defendant's motion for new trial.

The trial court acted arbitrarily and oapriciously in holding that the so-:caUed newly discovered
evidence would be decisive upon ano,the.r trial or would
seriously ,affect the result.
(c)

Plaintiff was hospitalized and treated for a period of one week during the latter part of May, 1948
at the Southern Pacific General Hospital in San
Francisco, California. He testified at the trial that
he was hospitalized for approximately two weeks.
Hi.s affidavit reveals that he was honestly mistaken as
to the length of his hospitalization. Can it truly be said
that the newly discovered evidence was so strong and
convincing that with its introduction a different result
would necessarily follow~ Can it be stated with integrity
that whether plaintiff was hospitalized one week or two
weeks for treatment a year after his accident made a
vital i.ssue in this case~ We submit that the trial judge
who so held acted arbitrarily and capriciously.
In Turner v. Stevens, 8 Utah 75, 30 P. 24, 25, the
court stated:
"The defendant also insists that a new trial
should have been ordered on the ground of newly
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discovered evidence. We are disposed to believe
that the newly discove.red evidence w-ould not be
dedisive upon arnother trial, and therefore we do
not feel authorized to order a new trial on account
of it."

the

In BatUmgarten v. Hoffman, 9 Utah 338, 34 P. 294,
discussed the rule contended for herein:

~ourt

''The testimony offered on the trial was conflicting. The jury found the issues for the plaintiff. There was sufficient evidence to justify the
verdict, and the judgment should not be disturbed
on that ground. Nor do we think the newly-discovered evidence was of such a nature as to seriorusly .aff.ec·t the result if it had been known at the
time, and admitted. The facts stated in the affidavit of Quinn are not inconsistent with those
stated in the affidavit of Baumgarten, and the
latter clearly explains the former, and tends to
sustain the testimony given on the trial where
respondent claims a loss of $20 because of the
failure of the appellant to complete his contract
and pay for the goods ordered. A new trial
should wot be g'rlanted upon the ground of newlydis()ove;re.d evidence unless such evidence is very
cle·ar and s·atisjactory amd likely to seriously
affect the result W admitted. People v. Sackett,
14 Mich. 325; Tiernan v. Trewick, 2 Utah, 393;
Hopkins v. Ogden City, 5 Utah, 390, 16 Pac. Rep.
596. ''
Wood v. Akridge (Utah, Oct. 19, 1934) 36 P. 2d 804,

808:
''A motion for a new trial was made by defendant based on affidavits indicating newly disSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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covered evidence. Counter affidavits were filed
on behalf of plaintiff wherein some of the· allegations in appellant's affidavits were admitted,
some were denied, and others explained. Had all
this testimony been before the court at the trial,
the decision of the court would have been the
same. There was no error in denying a new trial.''
Warshauer Sheep & Wool Co. v. RiO' Gr-ande St:ate
Bank} (Colo. Apr.18, 1927), 256 P. 21,22:
''To justify the granting of a new trial on the
ground of newly discovered evidence, it must appear, among other things, that ·such evidence
makes it prob.able that a differ-ent verdict would
result on a new trial. Walsmith v. Hudson, 77
Colo. 326, 328, 236 P. 783 ; Eachus v. People, 77
Colo. 445, 450, 236 P. 1009, and cases there cited."
Plaintiff testified that he was hospitalized for two
weeks whereas in truth and in fact he was hospitalized
for only one week. No special damage issue is involved.
Can it be honestly contended that the jury's verdict
would have been different had the testimony been that
plaintiff was hospitalized one week rather than two
weeks~ Is it so inconceivable that plaintiff, an uneducated
colored man, could have been honestly mistaken as to
the duration of his hospitalization~ Were our trial courts
allowed to grant new trials for sU:ch light and trivial
reasons where would there be an end to litigation~
What reliance could litigants place upon their right of
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trial by jury~ What would happen to their constitutional
right of appeal~
POINT II.
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL
ERROR IN GIVING INSTRUCTION NO. 7. (Assignment of
Error No. 3).

Instruction No. 7 is herein set forth for the convenience of the court (R. 063):
''You are instructed that where one may perform a duty in either of two ways, one safe and
the other dangerous, and with full knowledge that
one method of performing the duty is safe and the
other dangerous and with full opportunity to
make a choice as to which method he shall adopt,
voluntarily chooses the dangerous method, such
conduct on his part constitutes negligen:ce.
''Therefore, if you find from a preponderence
of the evidence in this case that the plaintiff,
John D. Marshall, was warned of the approach
of the jitney tractor and that he could have
stepped onto the chair car or could have stepped
over to the east with equal ease or could have
stepped to any other position which was safe,
but voluntarily chose to remain in a dangerous
position knowing the same to he dangerous, then
he is guilty of negligence, and if such negligenbe
proximately contributed to cause the accident and
any injuries he claims to have suffered he cannot
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recover and you must return a verdict for the
defendant 'no cause of action.' ''
It is a well known principal of law that where an
instruction which is correct as an abstract principal of
law, nevertheless is not supported or warranted by evidence presented in the case, then the instruction is improper and reversible error.
The question naturally arises therefore as to what
dangerous position plaintiff voluntarily assumed. If
there was no evidence of such dangerous position, then,
of course, the instruction is erroneous. There was nine
feet of distance between the side of the chair car and
the umbrella posts running parallel thereto along the
platform. The four-wheeled truck, which was standing
on the platform, was approximately three feet in width,
and its south end was against an umbrella post. It was
on a slight diagonal. Plaintiff was standing with his
back against the ~hair car at the time the accident
occurred. Therefore, he occupied only a few inches of
space.
Marshall testified that there was p~enty of
room for the jitney and four-wheeled truck to have
passed between him and the standing four-wheeled truck
(R. 30, 31). Malan testified positively that there was
plenty of room for the jitney and four-wheeled truck to
pro:ceed along the platform to the south and past where
Marshall was standing (R.lOl, 102).
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Into what danger did Marshall place himself when
he chose to remain in hia position next to the chair car
rather than move to some other position, assuming, of
course, that the defendant's evidence is to be believed?
There is simply no answer to that question. There is no
evidence nor inference deducible from evidence, that it
waa or would be dangerous for plaintiff to remain next
to the chair car. If that be true, the instruction
which authorized the jury to determine that plaintiff
voluntarily chose to remain in a dangerous position was
erroneous because entirely unsupported by the evidence.
Plaintiff's only danger resulted from the manner in
which Miller operated and manipulated the jitney and
four-wheeled truck as he proceeded in a southerly direction to and beyond plaintiff. Plaintiff remained stationary from the time Miller approached until the accident occurred. Therefore, his actions, if they ~ontributed
to the accident at all, must have been in remaining next
to the chair car. He could not have been negligent in
taking a dangerous position unless there was something
in the general situation that would lead a reasonably
prudent person under the circumstances to believe there
was danger in the position which he assumed. There is
no such evidence. The sole and only cause of plaintiff's
injuries was the manner in which Miller operated the
jitney. If Miller had proceeded in a proper manner there
was space for him to have passed beyond where plaintiff
was standing. He chose to swing the jitney-tractor and
four-wheeled truck to his left and at the same time failed
to keep a lookout to his left to determine whether or not
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such movement could be made in .safety. His evidence is
interesting in this regard (R. 116):

'' Q. Weren't you watching the car?
A. No, I was watching Marshall.
Q. Didn't you ever watch the truck?
A.

No, I never looked at the truck.

Q. You could see that car!
A. I didn't pay any attention.

Q. You could have seen if you had

looked~

A. I didn't look at it. My wagon wasn't two
feet from that wagon, I came up to put the
box on.

Q. If you had looked over to the east, you could
have seen that :car, couldn't you?
A. I could have. There wasn't nothing between
me, but I wasn't paying any attention.

Q. You thought you could get by Mr. Marshall?
A. I asked him to move his foot box and move
to the east.
Q.

He didn't move, did he?

A.

He .says he had plenty of room, and I went
on and caught the end of the wa_gon and it
swung around and hit the car, and I asked
him, did it hit you in the stomach?''

Plaintiff remained in a position where he had no
control over the instrumentalities causing the accident.
Thereafter, Miller could have either traveled so slow as
to prevent a skidding of his four-wheeled truck sideways
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and against the car, or he could have kept a lookout to
the east and determined with certainty whether or not
the four-wheeled truck was clearing the standing truck,
or he could have done both of these things. Plaintiff
was entitled to rely upon Miller operating the jitney and
four-wheeled truck in a careful and prudent manner.
The evidence in this case simply does not warrant
Instruction No. 7. As a matter of law plaintiff did not
voluntarily choose to remain in a dangerous position.
His position in and of itself was not dangerous. Malan
did not think it was dangerous and there was no evidence
from which a jury could infer that it was dangerous. The
only danger which could exist for plaintiff was danger
created by the manner in which the jitney was operated.
As will be discussed in detail under Point III, he was
under no duty to anti.cipate danger which could only
come to him through the negligent operation of the jitney
and four-wheeled truck. We, therefore, submit for the
reasons discussed herein and under Point III that plaintiff was seriously prejudiced by said instruction which
was unwarranted under the facts of this case.
POINT III.
THERE WAS NO EVIDENTIARY BASIS FOR THE
SUBMISSION OF 'THE ISSUE OF PLAINTIFF'S CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE TO THE JURY. (Assignment of
Errors No. 2, 3 and 5).

Defendant had the burden of introducing evidence
in support of its allegations of contributory negligence.
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tain itB burden and that there was no evidentiary basis
for submission of the issue of contributory negligence
to the jury.
As has been heretofore pointed out, even under defendant's evidence, plaintiff never once moved from his
position after the jitney started past him. It is also .clear
that plaintiff had no other position to which he could
retire in the event the moving truck were to skid ·Bideways and into him. Even assuming that plaintiff motioned :Jiiller to continue in his southward movement, the
evidence is neverthless undisputed that there was plenty
of room for l\filler to have passed by Marshall had he
operated the jitney and truck in a careful and prudent
manner. Marshall's conduct had come to rest. Miller's
conduct was continuing. Marshall was in a position from
which he could not extricate himself; Miller was in a
position whereby he could have prevented the accident bYi
the exercise of ordinary care. Furthermore, Marshall
was entitled to assume that Miller would operate the
jitney and truck in a careful and prudent manner.
Marshall was under no obligation to anticipate that Miller would be negligent in operating the vehicle.
In Mathews v. D~aly West Mining Co., 27 Utah 193,
75 P. 722 ( 1904), plaintiff was an employee of an ore
mill. The superintendent told him that he was going to
shut the mill down for one-half hour and for plaintiff
to look the mill over while it was down. In making his
check plaintiff discovered a cap nearly off. He procured
a candle and wrench and laid across a belt in order to
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tighten the cap. While thus situated and engaged the
mill was suddenly and unexpectedly started and plaintiff was injured. It was contended by defendant that the
safe method of tightening the cap was for a workman to
get down underneath and lie on his back while someone
else held a candle and that he thus could have tightened
the cap without being exposed to danger although the
mill was in operation, or placed in operation while the
task was being performed. The testimony indicated
that the method suggested and the method being used
by plaintiff were each safe as long as the mill was not in
operation. It was proved that it was customary to give
a warning when the mill was about to start. No such
warning was given. Defendant contended that as plaintiff knew of a safe method in which to perform the work
but chose a dangerous method he was guilty of contributory negligence. The court stated:
''They rely upon the well-settled rule of law
that when the servant knows, or by the: exercise
of ordinary care can ascertain, that there are both
safe and dangerous ways by which he can perform his duties, if he voluntarily chooses to pursue one of the ways that is dangerous, he assumes
the natural and ordinary risk incident to the way
he has chosen* * *''
and that
"It is also well settled that the negligence of
the master is not among the risks so assumed by
the servant. Therefore when the servant, in the
discharge of his duties, is in a position which is,
under the conditions which then exist, naturally
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safe, but is suddenly made dangerous by the negligence of the master, and the injury to the· servant
is immediately caused thereby, the master is
liable.''
In JicCulloch v. Horton, (Mont.), 56 P. 2d 1344,
1346, action was brought by plaintiff for personal injuries
sustained by him while on defendant's premises through
the alleged negligent operation of a truck by defendant.
It appeared from the facts that plaintiff was standing
near defendant's garage door and that the defendant was
backing a truck out of the garage. There was some evidence that he backed out unusually fast and some that
he didn't back out straight. At any rate the truck struck
the side of the door frame and caused a portion of the
truck to fall down and strike the plaintiff inflicting
injuries.
Defendant contended that plaintiff was familiar with
the operation of the truck and the fact that the portion
of the truck which fell was sometime.s not held in place
by hooking chains and that plaintiff covuld have O'C'cupied
a ,position of greater safety and was therefotre guilty O'f
negligence. The court overruled defendant's contention
in this regard and stated:
"Mere knowledge of the existence of an offending instrumentality at the place whe·re· an
injury is suffered does not raise a legal presumption of contributory negligence, unless it further
appears that the plaintiff had reason to apprehend
danger. Hughey v. Fergus County, 98 Mont. 98,
37 P. (2d) 1035; Mullins v. City of Butte, 93
Mont. 601, 20 P. (2d) 626; Neilson v. l\1issoula
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Creamery Co., 59 Mont. 270, 196 P. 357. The failure to anticipate negligence which results in injury is not negligence and will not defeat the action for the injury sustained. 20 R.C.L. 118; Central Railroad Co. v. De Busley (C.C.A.) 261 F.
561; Wagner v. Philadelphia Rapid Transit Co.,
252 Pa. 354, 97 A. 471; North Bend Lumber Co.
v. Seattle, 116 Wash. 500, 199 P. 988, 19 A.L.R.
415. ''
In Greenwood v. Summers, ,et 'al., (Cal.) 149 P. 2d
35, 37, the court stated:
''In determining, in the present case, whether
Misko exercised the care which a man of common
prudence would have exercised, the trial court
undoubtedly relied upon the law and the e:vidence.
So far as the law is concerned, section 527 (a) of
the Vehicle Code, St. 1935, p. 182, states it as follows : 'Drivers of vehicles proceeding in opposite
directions shall pass each other to the right, and,
except when a roadway has been divided into
traffic lanes, each driver shall give to the other at
least one-half of the main traveled portion of the
roadway whenever p'ossible.' So far as the evidence is concerned, the court would have been
warranted in finding that Summers violated this
statute and trespassed on territory reserved for
traffic going south. Misko, running generally at
a distance of approximately two feet west of the
center white line, in our opinion, might justly
have considered that he was safe from a collision
with northbound traffic. Under those circumstances, it is understandable that the trial court
would fail to find him guilty of negligence. The
general rule is that every person who is himself
exercising ordinary care has a ri_ght to presume
that every other person will perform his duty and
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obey the law, and in the absence of reasonable
ground to think otherwise it is not negligence to
assume that he is not exposed to danger which
comes to him only from violation of law or duty
by such other person. See Harris v. Johnson,
1916, 17-! Cal. 55, 58, 161 P. 1155, L.R.A. 1917C,
477, Ann. Cas. 1918E, 560; Pinello v. Taylor, 1933,
128 Cal. App. 508,512,17 P. 2d 1039."
See also Pinello v. Taylor (Cal.) 17 P. 2d 1039, and
Boweq-s et ux v. Foster et ux., (Wash.) 278 P. 1072.
In Beck v. Sirota (Cal.) 109 P. 2d 419, 423, plaintiff was stationed on a scaffold working. An automobile
underneath the scaffold being driven away by an employee of defendant, caught on an electric light cord
hanging from the scaffold causing plaintiff to lose hia
position and fall. The court, in discussing contributory
negligence, stated :

'' * * * Plaintiff had a right to presume that
the defendant and his agents would perform their
duty by removing the machines in such a manner
as would avoid injuring the cleaners. It is a
general rule that every perBon has a right to
presume that every other person has performed
his duty and obeyed the law. In the absenlce of
reasonable grounds to think otherwise, it is not
negligelice for him to assume that he is n:ot exposed to danger which can come to him only from
a violation of law or duty by such other person.
Robbiano v. Bovet, 218 Cal. 589, at page 597, 24
P. 2d 466; Harris v. J:ohnaon, 174 Cal. 55, at page
58, 161 P. 1155, L.R.A. 1917C, 477, Ann. Cas.
1918E, 560; Moreno v. Los Angeles Transfer Co.,
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44 Cal. App. 551, 186 P. 800; Medlin v. Spazier,
23 Cal. App. 242, 137 P. 1078."
In Hechler et al v. McDonrnell (Cal.) 109 P. 2d 426,
428, plaintiff was sitting on a sto·ol in a restaurant.
While she was so lo.cated one of defendant's employees
mopped the platform around the stool. When plaintiff
arose and stepped onto the platform she slipped and
was injured. Again the court in discussing contributory
negligence and plaintiff's right to rely upon defendant
refraining from negligence which would cause her to
suffer injury, stated:

'' * * * Even if plaintiff had given any
thought to the platform before rising from the
stool, she would have been justified in assuming
that it had been mopped properly and in a manner that would not endanger her safety, and that
appellant would not expose her to a danger that
would come to her only through a violation of his
duty to her. 20 R.C.L. 66; De Verdi v. Weiss,
16 Cal. App. 2d 439, 60 P. 2d 879; Tuttle v.
Crawford, 8 Cal. 2d 126, 63 P. 2d 1128."
Marshall was not guilty of contributory negligence
for the following reasons: (1) there was no evidence
from which a jury could find that the position which he
assumed was dangerous ; ( 2) after the jitney proceeded
past Marshall, Miller had it within hi;:; power to prevent
the accident and Marshall did not.
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POINT IV.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO SUBMIT
THE ISSUE OF LAST CLEAR CHANCE TO THE JURY.
(Assignment of Errors No. 2 and 5).

The doctrine of last clear chance is traceable to the
celebrated case of Davies v. Marnn, 10M & W 548 (1842).
In that case plaintiff, having hobbled his jack ass, turned
it out to graze on a public highway, 8 yards wide. Here
the ass remained, and was peacefully _grazing on the side
of the road, when defendant's wagon and horses, came
down a slight descent, ran against and injured the ass.
The driver of the wagon was. ~areless in being ·some distance behind his horses while they were proceeding along
the highway at a rapid pace. The court decided that as
defendant might by proper care have avoided injuring
the animal, he was liable for the consequences of his
negligence even though plaintiff himself was guilty of
negligence in hobbling the ass and turning it on a public
highway.
Since the decision in Davies v. Ma'YI!Yb, the doctrine of
last clear chance has developed into a well-established
and universally recognized principle and has been applied
to numerous fact situations.
The generally accepted rule is well stated in Girdner
v. Union Oil Compa;ny of Califo·rnia, (decided Aug. 9,
1932) 13 P. 2d 915, 917:

'' * • * The apparent confusion which exists
in some of the decisions upon the subject arises in
the application of the law to the facts, but as
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to the rule itself there is little or no confusion.
It would be a strange case indeed, to say the
least, that would declare it to be permissible to
run down and injure one simply because he was
in a position of peril of which he was unaware,
without responding in damages for his willful act.
Such, of course, is not the law. A defendant is
never relieved of liability if he has it in his power
to prevent the injury. This doctrine applies
whether one is unaware of his peril by reason of
his negligence, or when exercising ordinary care is
so ignorant. In either situation the rule is the
same. A defendant is not privileged to ilnjure
ano ther simply because he is rnegligently or otherwise in ·a p~osition of danger. If he has the opportunJity of avoiding the injury, he must at his peA'il
·exercise it. The rule of the last clear chance means
just what the words imply. A party who has the
last .chance to avoid the accident, notwithstanding
the previous negligence of a plaintiff, is solely
responsible. Townsend v. Butterfield, 168 Cal.
564, 143 P. 760; Harrington v. Los Angeles Ry.
Co., 140 Cal. 514, 526, 74 P. 15, 63 L.R.A. 238,
98 Am. St. Rep. 85; Palmer v. Tschudy, 191 Cal.
696, 218 P. 36; Berguin v. Pacific Elec. Ry. Co.,
203 Cal. 116, 263 P. 220; Darling v. Pacific Elec.
Ry. Co., 197 Cal. 702, 242 P. 703; Atkins v. Bouchet, 86 Cal. A pp. 294, 260 P. 828 ; 0 'Farrell
v. Andrus, 86 Cal. App. 474, 260 P. 957; Smith et
al. v. Los Angeles Ry., 105 Cal. App., 657, 288 P.
690.''
1

Defendant's theory was that Miller stopped a short
'distance north of where plaintiff was standing, had a
conversation with plaintiff and thereafter proceeded in
a southerly direction past plaintiff at which time the
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four-wheeled truck cornered with a standing truck and
swung around striking plaintiff.
In view of defendant's eviden:ce plaintiff requested
an instruction on the doctrine of last clear chance in
its Requested Instruction No. 3, which was refused by
the trial court (R. 042). Under the facts as presented
by defendant we submit that a jury could well have found,
as in the old Davies v. Mann case, that plaintiff when he
chose to remain alongside the coach and allow the jitney
and truck to pa.ss had effectively hobbled himself, and
that thereafter, just as in the Dav ies v. Mawn case, defendant drove along with its jitney and trU:ck at an excessive rate of speed and without keeping a proper lookout,
running against plaintiff and causing him to sustain
his injuries. In other word.s, as the jitney passed where
plaintiff was standing he then was placed in a position
from which he could not extricate himself. We believe
that every necessary prerequisite of the doctrine of last
clear chance was present as a jury issue under the fact.s.
We do not by this statement wish it to be understood that
we are willing to assume that plaintiff was himself
guilty of contributory negligence. We believe there was
no evidence to justify such a finding. However, plaintiff '.s conduct had :come to rest and he was in a position
from which he could not extricate himself, or so the
jury could find, when the jitney tractor started past him.
1

In the case of Michig(Jfn City v. Werner (Ind. Dec.
1916), 114 N.E. 636, 186 Ind. 149, the plaintiff was crossing a bridge when it was raised by the bridge tender.
Defendant requested an instruction that the jury should
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find for the defendant if plaintiff was negligent in entering upon the bridge in an attempt to ~ross it. This instruction was refused by the trial court for the reason
that contributory negligence is not a defense where the
last clear chance situation exists and that it is improper
and erroneous for a court to nstruct the jury that contributory negligence will bar recovery unless the jury is at
the same time instructed that if the defendant had the
last clear chance to have avoided the accident and injuries then plaintiff's negligence would not bar recovery
and plaintiff would be entitled to a verdict. The court
stated:
''Instruction No. 4, refused by the court, if
given, would have been in conflict with instruction
No. 7, which properly states the law. The instruction refused directed the jury, in effect, to find
for the defendant if it appeared that the plaintiff
was negligent in entering upon the bridge in an
attempt to cross it. Under the doctrine of last
clear chance, as ·stated in instruction No. 7, to
the effect that if the injury to the plaintiff was
immediately caused by the negligence of the
bridge tender after he became aware of the dangerous situation of plaintiff and to his failure
to use ordinary care to avoid injury to him, then
the plaintiff was entitled to recover notwithstanding his prior negligence in entering upon the
bridge.''
In Teakle v. Sam Pedro, L. A. & S. L. R. Ca., (decided May 9, 1'907), 32 Utah 276, 90 P. 402, 408, decedent,
a licensee on defendant's railroad track, stepped in front
of a backing train, consisting of an engine, tender, mail
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car, and baggage car. He was struck by the baggage car
and thrown between the rails. No part of the train
injured him until he was struck by the firebox of the
engine, which rolled, dragged and crushed him to death.
The brakeman on the end of the baggage car gave signals to the engineer to stop as soon as decedent was
struck but was unable to attract the engineer's attention.
Another witne.ss ran along the track on the fireman's side
of the train and attempted to attract his attention, but
Was unable to do so. There was evidence that decedent
was alive until struck by the firebox, and that had the
brakes been applied immediately after decedent was first
struck, the train could have been stopped before the firebox reached him. The trial court directed a verdict in
favor of defendant, and the Supreme Court of Utah
reversed on the ground that the case should have been
submitted to the jury under the doctrine of last clear
chance, and .stated:

"* * * This court, in harmony with the great
weight of authority, seems to be committed to
the rule (when the injured or deceased person was
not a trespasser) that the defendant's act of negligence will be regarded as the sole proximate cause
of the injury, not only when relating to a breach
of duty occurring after the consequences of contributory negligence have been discovered, but
al.so when, in the exercise of ordinary care, such
consequences could have been discovered, if a
breach of duty intervened or :continued after the
commission of the contributory negligence. While
the breach of duty must be :subsequent to the commission of the contributory negligence, yet such
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breach of duty may be before, as well as after,
the discovery of the peril. This principle of law
has often been illustrated by cases where the
owner of stock was guilty of negligence in permitting it to stray upon the railroad track, and
where the liability of the company was made to
depend, not only upon the question of whether the
train operatives .could have avoided the injury
after the animal was discovered on or near the
track, but also whether, in the exercise of ordinary
care, the train operatives could or ought to have
discovered it in time to have avoided the injury.
So also in cases where one was guilty of negligence in the first instance in going upon the track
and by reason of being caught in a frog, or was
otherwise rendered unable to escape, and where
the railroad company was held liable, not only
for an omission of duty on the part of the train
operatives after discovering the peril, but also for
an omission of duty in not discovering it. In such
cases the contributory negligence is deemed the
remote, and the defendant's negligence the proximate cause of the injury. Such is the principle of
law which seems to have been announced by this
court in the case of Hall v. Railway Co., 13 Utah
243, 44 Pac. 1046, 57 Am. St. Rep. 726, and in
the case of Shaw v. City R. R. Co., 21 Utah 77,
59 Pac. 552, and is the principle of law stated in
the instruction which this court approved, and
which was involved in the question decided by the
court, in the case of Thompson v. Salt Lake Rapid
Transit Co., 16 Utah 281, 52 Pac. 92, 40 L.R.A.
172, 67 Am. St. Rep. 621, and is well illustrated in
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Inland & Seaboard Coasting Co. v. Tolson, 139
U.S. 557, 11 Sup. Ct. 653, 35 L. Ed. 270, and in
Grand Trunk Ry. Co. v. Ives, 144 U.S. 408, 12
Sup. Ct. 679, 36 L. Ed. 485. ''
The court's error in refusing to instruct on the doctrine of last clear chance was rendered manife,stly more
prejudicial to plaintiff when Instruction No. 7 ia considered in connection with this subject. The court not only
refused to allow the jury to consider the doctrine of last
clear chance, but instructed the jury that if Marshall
chose to remain in a dangerous position knowing the
same to be dangerous, then he was guilty of contributory
negligence, and in ·.such event was not entitled to recover.
In other words, the court attacked plaintiff's position in
both a negative and an affirmative manner, refusing
to instruct on last clear chance and further eliminating
the doctrine in its application to the facts by instructing that if plaintiff was contributorily negligent he could
not recover.
Some jurisdictions have held that the doctrine of
last clear chance applies only where plaintiff has placed
himself, deliberately or otherwise, in a dangerous position. Defendant, however, is precluded from taking this
position, for Instruction No. 7 allows the jury to find
that plaintiff chose to remain in a dangerous position.
If there waa no evidence of a dangerous position, Instruction No. 7 is erroneous. If there was evidence of a danSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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gerous position, all doubt as to the applicability of the
doctrine of last clear chance is relieved. In either event
error was committed by the trial court which prejudicially affected plaintiff's rights under the law.
CONCLUSION
It is respectfully submitted that Judge Hendricks
abused his legal discretion when he granted defendant's
motion for a new trial for the following reasons:
1. Defendant was not required as a condition prece-

dent to affirmatively show that it had exercised due diligence prior to and during the trial in discovering the
so-called newly discovered evidence.
2. The so-called newly discovered evidence was
offered and ultimately used for the sole purpose of impeachment.
3. Said evidence could not have seriously affected
the results of the trial.
It is futher submitted that the second trial court
committed prejudicial error when it submitted the issue
of contributory negligence and at the same time refused
to submit the issue of last clear chance to the jury.
Plaintiff was denied his constitutionally guaranteed
right of a fair and just trial by jury. We therefore respectfully submit that the jury'·s verdict at the conclusion
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of the second trial and judgment thereon should be set
aside, and also that the original verdict should be reinstated.
Respectfully submitted,
RAWLINGS, WALLACE, BLACK & ROBERTS
DWIGHT L. KING
WAYNE L. KING
.At~orrneys

for PlainffiJf/ and, .AppeUam~
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